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Abstract 
The traditional model for information dissemination in 
disaster response is unidirectional from official channels 
to the public. However recent crises in the US, such as 
Hurricane Katrina and the Californian Bushfires show 
that civilians are now turning to Web 2.0 technologies as 
a means of sharing disaster related information. These 
technologies present enormous potential benefits to 
disaster response authorities that cannot be overlooked. 
In Australia, the Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 
has recently recommended that Australian disaster 
response authorities utilize information technologies to 
improve the dissemination of disaster related, bushfire 
information. However, whilst the use of these 
technologies has many positive attributes, potential legal 
liabilities for disaster response authorities arise. This 
paper identifies some potential legal liabilities arising 
from the use of Web 2.0 technologies in disaster response 
situations thereby enhancing crisis related information 
sharing by highlighting legal concerns that need to be 
addressed. 
1. Introduction 
Web 2.0 technologies present new opportunities for 
disaster response authorities to collect, obtain and 
disseminate real-time crisis information to the public [1-
4]. However, very little research has thus far been 
conducted into the potential legal liabilities arising for 
disaster response authorities from the use of Web 2.0 
technologies for information collection and dissemination 
purposes. The issue of legal liabilities is important 
because whilst Web 2.0 technologies present new 
opportunities for disaster response authorities, they also 
raise a new set of concerns stemming from the manifold 
increase in information collection and provision 
pathways. As such, several potential legal liabilities could 
arise for disaster response authorities from the use of Web 
2.0 technologies, such as the inadvertent collation and 
dissemination of  inaccurate information to the public [4]. 
This paper intends to fill this gap in the literature.  Section 
2 outlines three disasters where Web 2.0 technologies 
have been used a means of obtaining and generating 
information. Section 3 then introduces a theoretical model 
for disaster response using Web 2.0 technologies. Section 
4 identifies a taxonomy of potential legal liabilities that 
can arise for Australian disaster response authorities from 
the use of Web 2.0 technologies for disaster response 
purposes. Finally, the authors conclude by suggesting 
avenues of further research. 
2. Examples of Web 2.0 Usage for Disaster 
Response  
Disaster situations create high levels of information 
need due to the high levels of uncertainty generated by the 
crisis [5, 6]. In this paper, ‘disaster’ means ‘a condition or 
situation of significant destruction, disruption, and/or 
distress to a community’ [7]. In discussing disaster 
response measures, the focus of this paper is 
predominantly on response activities which ‘activate 
preparedness arrangements and plans to put in place 
effective measures to deal with emergencies and disasters 
if and when they do occur’ [7], such as the issuing of 
warning messages, responding to calls for help and the 
dissemination of disaster related information to the public. 
Disasters are usually exemplified by a breakdown of 
communication, caused by damage to infrastructures,
such as telephone lines, so that victims of the disaster and 
citizens in general, may find it difficult to obtain up-to-
date information [5]. This lack of information propels 
those affected by the disaster to seek information. Usually 
the first point of call is through traditional media outlets 
and official channels, but when information via official 
channels is lacking or not up to date, then unofficial 
channels are used instead [5, 6]. Increasingly, these 
unofficial channels have taken the form of Web 2.0 
technologies. These technologies have enabled the public 
to play a greater role in disaster situations, both in the 
seeking of information as well as in providing information 
to each other [8]. For the purposes of this paper, Web 2.0 
is defined as “a set of social, economic and technology 
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trends that collectively form the basis for the next 
generation of the Internet – a more mature, distinct 
medium characterized by user participation, openness, 
and network effects [9].  
There are significant advantages in involving members 
of the general public in disaster response information 
provision. Local citizens, rather than trained disaster 
response professionals, are inevitably ‘the true first 
responders’ in disaster response situations given their 
proximity to the situation [10]. Web 2.0 technologies 
therefore provide a platform for citizens affected by 
disasters to participate in the accumulation, collection and 
dissemination of disaster response information. The next 
section provides a brief overview of how Web 2.0 
technologies were used in three recent disaster response 
situations, namely, Hurricane Katrina, the 2007 California 
wildfires and the 2009 Victorian bushfires.  
2.1 Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United 
States on August 29, 2005, causing severe damage to 
property with more than 1,800 people reported as having 
lost their lives. 
Numerous blogs, discussion threads and online sites 
were created by the public even before Katrina made 
landfall to assist in emergency planning and response 
[10]. The local newspaper, the New Orleans Times-
Picayune, ran a news blog providing news on hurricane 
damage and recovery efforts [11]. In addition the news 
blog also relayed information from its readers who sent in 
calls for help. Those calls were relayed onto the blog, 
which was monitored constantly by rescuers, who then 
sent in teams to save them. The calls for help came via 
text messaging because cellular voice services and 
landlines were inoperative [11]. Furthermore, 
MSNBC.com created one of the largest online, searchable 
lists to help people connect with missing friends and 
family [12].  
2.2 Californian Wildfires
In October 2007, a series of wildfires raged across 
Southern California, burning more than 500,000 acres of 
land, destroying nearly 1,500 homes and causing massive 
evacuations. During the wildfires, Twitter, text 
messaging, blogs, Flickr, and YouTube were used by 
residents to keep up-to-date with the latest developments 
[13]. The media also used Web 2.0 technologies to 
provide information to the public. Local news 
organisation KPBS created the 2007 San Diego County 
Fires – KPBS Online mashup [2] and used Twitter to send 
updates to its audience [14]. The ABC TV affiliate in San 
Diego, 10News, streamed its TV broadcast online for 38 
hours and the San Diego Union-Tribune's 
SignonSanDiego site used blogs to provide up-to-date 
information, while getting thousands of reader comments 
on articles, blog posts and in forums [15].  
During the wildfires, disaster response authorities also 
used Web 2.0 technologies as avenue for information 
dissemination. The US Los Angeles Fire Department 
(LAFD), for example, utilized a variety of Web 2.0 
technologies for the purpose of disseminating critical 
disaster response information to the public [16]. The 
LAFD used Twitter to post information about fires or 
other emergencies that it was responding to. These 
messages were sent to users who had signed up to receive 
LAFD information on their mobile devices [17]. The 
LAFD Twitter account had approximately 5,000 
followers by the end of June 2009 [18] and the LAFD 
Twitter feed was linked directly to the LAFD website 
[16]. Aside from Twitter, the LAFD also used a blog, a 
LAFD ALERT service and uploads images of fire fighters 
in action to Flickr [18].  
2.3 Victorian Bushfires  
On 7 February 2009, 173 persons died in Victoria from 
the effects of one of the most intense bushfires that 
Australia has thus far encountered. The speed and ferocity 
of the fires meant that it was very difficult for disaster 
response authorities to provide effective warnings to 
residents of affected areas regarding the location of fires 
and evacuation procedures Following the aftermath of the 
bushfires, the Victorian Government established a royal 
commission to investigate the disaster and to make 
recommendations on how to improve disaster responses 
in relation to large and severe bushfires. The 
Commission’s Interim Report [19] highlighted a number 
of weaknesses and failures regarding the Victorian 
Government’s dissemination of bushfire related 
information and the use of early warning systems. One of 
the key recommendations of the report was that the use of 
information technologies, and information collation 
processes should be improved to accelerate the provision 
of essential information to the public, via agency 
websites.  
Of interest, in this regard, is a geo-mashup created by 
Google Maps [20] using Victorian Government disaster 
response information to disseminate information to the 
public about the fires. The geo-mashup overlayed real-
time information about the location of fires provided by 
the Victorian Government’s lead bushfire fighting 
authority, the Country Fire Authority (CFA). Google 
created the map to assist those that might be affected by 
the fires including emergency management personnel and 
to take pressure off official websites that were inundated 
by Internet users [20]. The Google map was made 
possible because the CFA provided emergency related 
information via an open standard Really Simple 
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Syndication (RSS) feed that meant CFA information 
could be easily overlayed onto Google Maps [21]. Over 
one million visitors accessed the Google Map in the first 
week of its instigation [22]. However, the engineering 
director of Google Australia confirmed that while the 
CFA were willing to provide bushfire related information, 
the Victorian Department of Sustainability and 
Environment (DSE), which is the data custodian for fires 
on public lands in Victoria, did not have an RSS feed to 
disseminate their information but also refused Google 
access to their internal data [22]. The reason being Crown 
copyright provisions that assigned copyright over 
government-produced information to the DSE and thus 
prevented use of the information by third parties unless 
specific consent was granted. Another geo-mashup of 
interest was produced by Aus-emaps.com that overlayed 
data from the Geoscience Australia’s Sentinel national 
bushfire monitoring system [23].  
However Government attitudes towards the sharing of 
information appear to be changing. For example, the 
Government 2.0 Taskforce was set up to explore 
initiatives that promote greater information disclosure, 
digital innovation and online engagement. Relevantly for 
this paper, one of projects funded by the Taskforce is the 
Social Media for Emergency Management Project. The 
project investigated leading and emerging best practice in 
relation to the use of social media for improving location 
enabled information sharing between emergency 
management agencies and the affected community [24].  
However the project did not examine the legal liabilities 
arising from the use of these social media tools, thus 
demonstrating the gap in the literature that whilst these 
technologies are being used in disaster response, little 
attention has thus far been paid to the potential legal 
liabilities arising from such use. 
3. A Disaster Response 2.0 Model for 
Information Provision  
The examples outlined above show that there are two 
broad models for the use of Web 2.0 technologies in 
disaster response. The first involves initiatives that 
demonstrate the use of Web 2.0 technologies by 
individuals and media organizations to disseminate 
‘ground level’ information provided by members of the 
public, such as in Hurricane Katrina. The second includes 
elements of public information sharing but there is a 
greater emphasis on the use of official government 
information channeled through non-official sources, such 
as the LAFD use of Twitter and the Google Victorian 
Bushfire map. The next step for Web 2.0 related disaster 
information dissemination is therefore a model that 
incorporates information provided by the public and used 
by government authorities for disaster response purposes. 
The diagram below outlines the information pathways in 
the next step of Web 2.0 usage for disaster response 
purposes.  
Figure 1. Disaster Response 2.0 Model of Information Flow 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the incorporation of Web 
2.0 technologies radically changes traditional information 
dissemination pathways. First, there are a significantly 
greater number of different information providers. 
Members of the public are involved at a much greater 
level and provide information direct to government or to 
unofficial sources. Second, the incorporation of unofficial 
sources, such as Google Maps, as represented by the 
green ovals, also greatly increase the flow of information 
by providing a different avenue for the receipt of disaster 
related information in three ways: direct from the public; 
from the public via government and from the government 
themselves. Third, both unofficial and official portals also 
increase the dissemination of information both to the 
public and to government. There is a possibility of two 
levels of bi-directional flow: from the public to the 
information dissemination portals and from the disaster 
response authorities to the information dissemination 
portals. However, it should also be noted that traditional 
routes of information exchange will also take place 
between different disaster response authorities and 
agencies within government. Accordingly, the use of Web 
2.0 technologies greatly increases the number of avenues 
for information flow amongst a greater number of parties 
but it reduces the scope of organisational custodianship of 
disaster related information due to the significant increase 
in information sharing amongst different groups.  
The model reflects the key ideals of Web 2.0, which is 
to foster greater user participation, increase openness and 
to enhance information sharing through a more 
decentralized structure. However, the potential 
implications for information dissemination pathways are 
profound in this new model because Web 2.0 ideals and 
technologies do not respect organizational boundaries. In 
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effect, whilst government agencies receive more 
information, they have less control over how it is verified, 
disseminated and used. Nevertheless, the requirement for 
up-to-date and accurate information is paramount for 
disaster response purposes [4, 8].  
This requirement places great pressure on the disaster 
response authorities that have the task of collecting and 
disseminating disaster related information, as well as 
those agencies responsible for the actualities of a
response, such as mass evacuation. Disaster response 
authorities may be put under considerable pressure as they 
will have the unenviable task of verifying and 
authenticating the content of publicly generated disaster 
response information. Furthermore, it is likely that this 
verification process will have near real-time demands as 
disaster response information will be required almost 
immediately on receipt by a number of different parties. 
As such, certain legal risks arise for disaster response 
authorities from the use of Web 2.0 technologies in 
disasters [4, 25, 26].  
4. A Taxonomy of Potential Legal Liabilities 
During disasters, the actions or non-actions of disaster 
response authorities can cause injury, death or property 
damage and could potentially expose them to litigation, 
such as an action alleging negligence. Further, disaster 
response authorities in Australia are also subjected to a 
myriad of State and Federal legislation, so that it may also 
be possible to bring an action against the authority for 
breach of statutory duty. Legislation may also provide 
protection from liability.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail 
the current statutory regime surrounding disaster response 
authorities. Instead, the focus is on potential legal 
liabilities arising from the use of Web 2.0 technologies. 
The reason for this focus is recognition of the change in 
information channels that would arise from the use of 
Web 2.0 technologies in a disaster response setting (as 
identified in [3] above), where rather than the more 
traditional uni-directional flow of information, a Disaster 
Response 2.0 Model would utilize various means for 
information flow generated from a variety of sources.   
The authors identify three sources of liability that 
could emerge from the Disaster Response 2.0 model: 
dissemination of inaccurate information, failure to 
provide adequate warnings and inadequate responses to 
calls for help made via Web 2.0 technologies.  
4.1 Dissemination of Inaccurate Information  
A key concern arising from the Disaster Response 2.0 
model relates to the collection and dissemination of 
inaccurate information. As highlighted above, the model 
potentially presents difficulty because maintaining the 
accuracy of information is dependent on multiple parties 
who have different expectations regarding the collection 
and dissemination of disaster related data. This is 
compounded by the fact that different data sets can now 
be easily combined to create new information, which may 
also need to be checked. Accordingly, the incorporation 
of user-generated information within official government 
information collection structures could mean that 
inadvertent, but nonetheless inaccurate information, is 
published thus opening the government agency to 
potential legal actions. 
Agencies are potentially exposed to liability arising 
from the publication or dissemination of information 
through both official and unofficial portals. Liability may 
arise either for negligent misstatement at common law 
and/or misleading conduct under the state-based Fair 
Trading Acts [27]. The circumstances in which a potential 
claim for inaccurate or misleading information against an 
agency may arise are likely to include: 
1. The dissemination of inaccurate data from 
members of the public 
2. The dissemination of inaccurate data from 
another disaster response authority; 
3. The aggregation of 2 or more sets of accurate 
data which when combined and represented in a different 
format could mislead a recipient. 
If a recipient of information did make a successful 
claim for negligent misstatement or misleading conduct, 
the government would have potential liability for loss 
suffered as a result of the person’s reliance on the 
information. To avoid liability for negligent misstatement, 
an information provider must be able to show that 
reasonable steps are routinely taken to ensure the 
accuracy of disseminated information. The potential for a 
finding of negligence can therefore be reduced by 
showing that there is a coherent protocol in place to 
ensure the accuracy of both the agency supplied source 
information and information products that are an 
aggregation of multiple source data sets [28]. 
Furthermore, given the popularity of geo-mashups in 
disaster response situations, it is possible that liabilities 
could arise from inaccurate information published in the 
form of a map. In the United States, case law indicates 
that producers of maps and charts will be strictly liable for 
the products they produce. However it is doubtful that the 
rationale of strict liability imposed by US courts will 
apply in Australia since Australia no longer imposes a 
strict liability regime but now imposes a negligence/duty 
of care regime.  
4.2  Failure to Warn  
Another concern arising from the Disaster Response 
2.0 model is the legal liabilities arising from a failure to 
warn. Under the model, a failure to warn can arise in a 
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number of ways. The type of media used to distribute the 
warning could affect the accuracy of warning. Twitter, for 
example, only covers 140 characters so if twitter is used 
as a means of disseminating information, the messages or 
tweets, being sent to the public will be truncated. This 
could affect the content of the message. Potentially a 
member of the public receiving a warning message via 
Twitter could argue that the disaster response authority 
was negligent in issuing the warning because the message 
was so truncated that it was incomplete or 
incomprehensible and that this amounted to a failure to 
issue a warning. A service failure could also result in the 
warning message failing to reach the public [25]. For 
example, if the disaster response authority had an official 
Twitter account and used that account to issue a warning 
to the public but there was a service failure so the warning 
did not get sent. The authority could potentially be held 
responsible since the warning was issued via its official 
Twitter account but the service failure was outside its 
control. 
A disaster response authority in this situation could be 
faced with two potential sources of legal action: breach of 
statutory duty and negligence. 
4.2.1 Breach of Statutory Duty 
If the disaster response authority is under a statutory 
duty to issue warnings, then a failure to warn could 
expose the authority to an action in tort for breach of 
statutory duty. To bring an action for breach of statutory 
duty, the plaintiff must establish that a private cause of 
action in tort is available under the statute which is 
alleged to have been breached, that the harm suffered by 
the plaintiff was of a kind which the statute was enacted 
to prevent, that the plaintiff was a person for whose 
protection the statute was enacted, and that the emergency 
authority breached the statutory duty and the breach 
caused the plaintiff’s harm [29]. 
One difficulty in bringing such an action against a 
public authority is that it must first be established that a 
private cause of action is available under the statute, and 
some statutes expressly prohibit the bringing of a private 
cause of action [29]. 
Further, to provide some protection for public 
authorities, civil liability legislation in all States and 
Territories contain provisions detailing the standard 
applicable to public authorities [29, 30]. For example, 
Section 36 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) provides 
that ‘an act or omission of the authority does not 
constitute a wrongful exercise or failure unless the act or 
omission was in the circumstances so unreasonable that 
no public authority or other authority having the functions 
of that authority in question could property consider the 
act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of its 
functions’. Thus, within the Disaster Response Web 2.0 
Model, Civil Liability legislation could provide protection 
to disaster response authorities against a legal action for 
breach of statutory duty (assuming the relevant statute 
allowed for a private cause of action).  
4.2.2 Negligence 
An action may also arise in negligence against a 
disaster response authority for failing to issue a warning 
of an impending disaster if it can be shown that (a) the 
authority owed a duty of care and that duty encompasses a 
duty to issue warnings, (b) the duty was breached and (c) 
the breach caused the damage [31].  
In discussing ‘failure to warn’ as a potential source of 
liability in negligence, Eburn argues that proving a duty 
of care is ‘complex but at least arguable’ as a duty to warn 
may be found to exist if certain factors indicate that a duty 
has arisen [31]. Australian case law suggests that the 
approach taken by courts in determining whether a duty 
of care exists is a multi faceted inquiry where ‘[E]ach of 
the salient features of the relationship must be considered. 
The focus of analysis is the relevant legislation and the 
positions occupied by the parties on the facts as found at 
trial. It ordinarily will be necessary to consider the degree 
and nature of control exercised by the authority over the 
risk of harm that eventuated; the degree of vulnerability 
of those who depend on the proper exercise by the 
authority of its powers; and the consistency or otherwise 
of the asserted duty of care with the terms, scope and 
purpose of the relevant statute’ [32, pp. 597-8]. In 
addition, case law in Australia also establishes that a 
public authority may also be found to be under a common 
law duty of care when it exercises a statutory power or 
performs a statutory duty [33] so that in performing a 
statutory duty, the disaster response authority could be 
found to owe a duty of care. 
For the second element (breach of duty) case law in 
Australia suggests that establishing a breach of duty 
arising from a failure to warn may be difficult [34, 35, 
36]. Civil Liability legislation across all States and 
Territories except South Australia and Northern Territory 
also contain provisions dealing with the existence and 
breach of duty of care in negligence actions brought 
against statutory authorities [29]. In Queensland, for 
example, s 35 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) 
contains a list of principles for determining whether a 
public or other authority has a duty or has breached a duty 
[37].
In the context of the Disaster Response Web 2.0 
Model, in light of the cases discussed above, establishing 
a duty of care may not be problematic, but establishing 
that the duty was breached might be. The cases show that 
the courts will look at the relevant circumstances when 
deciding whether there has been a breach of duty. Thus it 
is arguable that so long as the relevant authority, given the 
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resources in at its possession, made all reasonable 
attempts to issue a warning, the courts may hold that it 
has not breached its duty to issue a warning. Support is 
also given to this line of argument from the principles 
listed in the Civil liability legislation (as discussed above) 
for determining duty and breach, where for example, two 
of the principles listed in the Queensland Civil Liability 
Act s35 are that ‘the general allocation of financial or 
other resources by the authority is not open to challenge’ 
and that ‘the functions required to be exercised by the 
authority are to be decided by reference to a broad range 
of its activities (and not merely by reference to the matter 
to which the proceeding relates). 
Proving damage may also be difficult. In order to prove 
damage, the plaintiff will have to show that if the warning 
of the risk had been given, the outcome would have been 
different [31]. It is important to note, as pointed out by 
Eburn, that the question is ‘would the plaintiff have 
responded differently if warned of the risk’ and therefore 
have avoided personal injury – the duty is a duty to warn 
of a risk, not a duty to accurately predict an outcome [31]. 
4.3 Inadequate Response  
The third source of potential liability arising from the 
Disaster Response 2.0 model relates to the adequacy of 
the disaster response. For example, if calls for help are 
made via unofficial portals how should the disaster 
response authorities receiving the message respond? 
Consider the following example. On a Sunday morning, 
the official Twitter account of the US Coast Guard 
receives the following message: ‘LzyMan: 
@USCGFORCECOM HELP! 5 ppl trapped in capsized 
vessel @ 25-59N75-97W, HELF sinking!!!!’ [26, 38]. A 
difficult arises for the disaster response authority because 
it is required to implement an appropriate response from 
very limited information. 
Australian authorities have already encountered such 
issues when two teenage girls got lost in a storm water 
drain and raised a call for help on Facebook rather than 
phoning emergency services. The two girls updated their 
Facebook status via their mobile phones to say they were 
lost in a stormwater drain in Adelaide’s southern suburbs. 
One of their friends was online at that time and made a 
call for help to emergency authorities [39].  
Whether there is a duty to respond to such messages so 
that non-action will give rise to an action in negligence 
will depend on the considerations outlined in Section 
4.2.2 above. If the call for help was made to an official 
emergency network, or an official Twitter account owned 
by the disaster response authority, then it is possible that a 
duty to respond will arise. However, assessing the nature 
of these messages (whether it is genuine or a hoax) and 
the level of response required is made more difficult by 
the nature of unofficial information provision, that the 
messages are usually truncated and may contain spelling 
errors. In situations where these circumstance arise, even 
if the authority has a duty to the individual, there may not 
be a breach of that duty if the disaster response authority 
decided not to respond or could not respond because the 
message was incomplete or assessed to be a hoax. The 
considerations outlined above in Section 4.2.2 will apply 
here.  
However, authorities can take steps to mitigate such 
liabilities. The coronial findings of the inquest into the 
death of David Iredale [40] provide an indication of the 
measures that authorities are required to implement. In 
that inquest, which concerned the death of a member of 
the public during a bushwalk in the Blue Mountains 
National Park in 2006, the deceased made a total of seven 
calls for help to an official emergency number. The 
Coroner identified a number of shortcomings in the way 
in which emergency calls were received, processed and 
disseminated and recommended that a working party be 
established to review the structure, operation, 
management and training for NSW government 
emergency call centers [40, para 99]. Accordingly, the 
levels of training provided to staff by authorities, in terms 
of assessing and collating the messages, may assist 
authorities in demonstrating the reasonableness of the 
their response in relation to truncated, Web 2.0 facilitated 
messages for help. 
If, however, the call for help was made to an unofficial 
portal not owned by the emergency authority then perhaps 
the question of whether a duty of care is owed may be 
more difficult to answer. 
5. Conclusion 
Information is a valuable commodity, particularly 
during disaster situations where up-to-date information is 
critical both for citizens as well as for disaster response 
authorities. Information and communication technologies 
have and will continue to revolutionize the way in which 
information is generated, shared and transmitted. Web 2.0 
technologies are a case in point. They have enabled 
citizens to share disaster related information with each 
other and thus have become another, albeit at present, 
unofficial avenue for citizens to obtain disaster related 
information. With disaster response authorities beginning 
to realize the potential of Web 2.0 technologies for 
disaster response, we may, in the future see government 
authorities utilize a structure of response similar to the 
Disaster Response 2.0 model outlined above. However, 
whilst use of Web 2.0 technologies in disaster response 
may have many advantages, this paper has shown that 
could the incorporation of new technologies within 
traditional organizational structures will introduce new 
information pathways that create new legal risks for 
disaster response authorities. An analysis of these risks as 
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well as an analysis of risk minimization strategies that can 
be incorporated into a Disaster Response model is 
required is required to equip with the necessary awareness 
and skills to protect themselves from future liabilities 
arising from the enhanced use of Web 2.0 technologies 
for disaster response.   
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